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ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes the gains from fiscal cooperation within the context of the standard
two commodity real trade model. It shows how the adjustment in terms of trade is the critical
factor in determining the effects of moving from a noncooperative equilibrium. In general, a
noncooperative equilibrium leads to an overexpansion of government expenditure on the
export good and an underexpansion on the import good, relative to a cooperative equilibrium.
The specific example of a logarithmic economy is also considered. The paper discusses








The increase in international economic interdependence during the past several years has stimu-
lated increased interest in questions pertaining to economic policy interdependence and coordination.
One particular aspect of this is the recognition that policy making in such an environment necessarily
involves strategic behavior. The formal analysis of such strategic behavior among international policy
makers began with the pioneering work of Hamada (1976) and has been extended more recently in
various directions by several authors.'
This literature can be characterized by two features. First, it focuses on monetary policy and
monetary interdependence. Second, the models employed are what one might characterize as Keyne-
sian type macro models, in which the objective is the minimization of a quadratic loss function, typi-
cally involving inflation and output as tradeoffs. While the linear-quadratic stabilization framework is
a well-established and convenient one, its limitations, in not focusing on any fundamental welfare
objective, are well known.
Recent work in international macroeconomic policy has undergone somewhat of a change in
emphasis. First, with the large U.S. government deficit, questions of fiscal interdependence have
come more to the fore.2 Secondly, this literature has tended to be cast in terms of utility-maximizing
agents, with the effects of fiscal changes being evaluated in terms of some explicitly stated welfare
function, typically the welfare of the representative individual; see, e.g., Frenkel and Razin (1985,
1986).
The present paper analyzes strategic fiscal policy making within the context of the standard two
country-two good real trade model. We first derive the optimal degrees of government expenditures
on both the export and the import good under the assumption that each policy maker behaves non-
cooperatively, taking his rival's actions as given. Expressions are obtained for the optimal degrees of
government expenditure, which are directly analogous to the expressions for the optimal tariff origi-
nally due to Johnson (1954). We then determine the optimal degrees of government expenditures in a
cooperative equilibrium, where joint utilities are maximized. Certain welfare conclusions are drawn2
and comparisons between the two equilibria can be made.
As a special example, we consider the case of a logarithmic utility function, with output fixed
and specialized in the two countries. Not only can this be solved explicitly very simply, but also some
useful insights as to the numerical gains from cooperation can be obtained in this case. Indeed, fol-
lowing this line it would appear that the differences between noncooperative and cooperative equili-
bria may be significantly greater than the more traditional macro models suggest. The reason for this
is that fiscal policies generate large international spillovers through relative price movements and
these render an important role for strategic policy making.
Most of the literature focuses on a world consisting of two countries. In the latter part of the
paper, the logarithmic utility function is used to address an important, but neglected, question. We
consider a world consisting of three countries and assess the effects of the formation of a coalition
between two of them, upon the welfare of the third.
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we should relate the present paper to other recent
studies. Devereux (1986) looks at the question of the gains from fiscal coordination using a model
based on logarithmic preferences. A number of authors including Kehoe (1987), Cheri and Kehoe
(1987), and Devereux (1986) examine the divergence between noncooperative and cooperative fiscal
policies as the number of economies in the world increase. Also, Hamada (1986) considers optimal
strategic fiscal policy in a two-period, single commodity framework. Although our analysis is con-
ducted within the context of the two country-two good trade model, in which the transmission occurs
through the terms of trade, with little more than notational change, one can interpret our results as
applying to a two-period world, much closer to the framework of Hamada, or Frenkel and Razin. In
this case the relative price is the intertemporal interest rate, rather than the intratemporal terms of
trade.3
2. THE MODEL
Consider the standard two country-two good trade model, where both countries are competitive.
The countries are indexed by A, B, the goods by x, y, and we assume without loss of generality that
Country B imports x in return for y, which it exports to Country A. There are no impediments to
trade, so that relative prices in the two countries are equal.
The basic model is described by the following set of equations:
U =U1(C,,C,G,G) i =A,B (1)
aulau' i=A,B (2) ac ac
i=A,B (3)







C denotes the consumption of good j in Country i, i =A,B, j =x,y
Q denotes the production of good j in Country i,
E' denotes excess demand for good j in Country i,
G' denotes government expenditure on good j in Country i,
c denotes the relative price of good y to good x in the world economy.
Equations (1) defme the utility functions of representative agents in Countries A, B. These are
functions of: (i) private consuinptions of the two goods; (ii) government expenditures on the two
goods. The utility functions are assumed to be increasing functions of their respective arguments and
to be continuous, twice differentiable, and quasi-concave. Equations (2) specify the optimality4
conditionsfor consumers with respect to private consumption (C,')ineach country. The quantities of
government expenditures are fixed, as far as private agents are concerned, but are determined by the
two governments, in accordance with the strategic behavioral regimes to be discussed below.
Equations (3) and (4) apply analogously to production. Equation (3) defines the production pos-
sibility curve, which is assumed to be concave, while (4) specifies the usual marginal product condi-
tions for optimality. Equations (5)definethe excess demand for good jinCountry i to be production
less private consumption and domestic government expenditure. For the import good E <O. We also
assume that government expenditure in each country is financed by lump sum taxation. The govern-
ment budget is therefore balanced and there are no distortionary effects of taxes on consumption.
Equation (6) describes the balance of trade equilibrium for the two countries, while (7) specifies
market clearance in the world market for the two goods. It is clear from (6) and (7) that only one
goods market is independent. Equilibrium in one implies equilibrium in the other, so that one equa-
tion, say (7b), can be dropped.
3. OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICIES: NONCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
The welfares of the respective representative agents in the two economies are given by the util-
ity functions UA, UB. We assume initially, that the two governments act noncooperatively to maxim-
ize the welfare of their respective citizens, taking the actions of the rival government as given. In
each case, the government has two possible fiscal instruments: expenditure on the export good, and
expenditure on the import good. Both instruments will be considered.
Consider first Country A. Using (5),(6),and (7b), its utility function may be expressed as:
UA =UA[Q- crE-G, Q,A +Eg G, G', G]
To determine the optimal government expenditure on the export good, we differentiate UA with




Thisequation is obtained in precisely the same way as is the optimal tariff.4 It is therefore the
direct analogue to the well-known optimal tariff formula; see, e.g., Takayama (1974), Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1983). Equation (8) can be given a simple interpretation. In a single commodity world, in
which government expenditure is financed by lump sum taxation, the optimal level of government
expenditure on the export good is to equate the marginal rate of substitution between government
expenditure and private expenditure on that good to the relative price, namely unity. But in the
present two-commodity world, the change in government expenditure on good x say, induces a
change in the relative price of good x to good y. This causes further substitution between the two
private goods, the result of which is that the marginal rate of substitution between good x and the
public good is adjusted away from unity, in response to this relative price effect.
To derive the relative price effect, we first note that the optimality conditions (2), (4), together
with (5), (6), determine the excess demand functions
E=EJ(c,G,G)i=A,B, j=x,y
Substituting these expressions into the market clearing condition (7a) and differentiating, one can
show that under reasonable conditions5
(9)
Plausibly, an increase in government expenditure on good x raises its relative price, and we refer to
this as being the normal case. But the opposite case where 8c/G> 0 cannot be ruled out a priori.
The optimal government expenditure on the import good, obtained by differentiating UA with
respect to G1, is derived similarly. Omitting details it is given by the expression
=[1+!L—k--] (10)
aU4/8C,A o 8G
where we may show that under normal conditions 3o/8G> 0. Hence an increase in government6
expenditure on the import good raises excess demand for that good, causing its relative price to rise.
The marginal rate of substitution between private and government expenditure on the import good is
equated to a quantity in excess of the relative private of unity.







whereunder normal conditions, 8o/8G!< 0,8o-/8G>0,and the interpretation of the optimality con-
ditions (11) and (12) are analogous to those for Country A.
The optimality conditions (8), (10), (11) and (12) are various reaction functions, some or all of
which may apply, depending upon what fiscal instruments are being varied. For example, if the two
countries optimize with respect to their respective export goods, then the reaction functions are (8)
and (11) respectively, which jointly determine the Nash equilibrium noncooperative outcomes for G
and G. It is also possible for both governments to optimize with respect to both commodities, in
which case, these four equations will determine the equilibrium values of the four variables G, G,
G!, and Gj.
4. COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
We now assume that the two policy makers act cooperatively, to maximize their joint welfare
function.
W =u-[Ce, C, G, G] +UBEC!,C, G, G] (13)
The optimality conditions with respect to the four government expenditure variables, obtained by dif-
ferentiating (13), subject to the equations of the system (1 )-(10),are given by7
OW= —(9UA[i + EA__] +
8UA+OUR = 0 (14a) 8G8C ' aG 8GZOC! 8G
OW=OUA[i +.L-:-.] +
OUA+3U = 0 (14b)
8G 8C1' o8G8Gj8C 8G





ow=au —Ej, +OUB—OUA = 0 (14d) OG ac! c aG0c o8G
Again, only some subset of these equations may apply, if only some subset of the fiscal variables are
being optimized.
Consider, for example, equation (1 4a). It is evident by comparison with (8), that when govern-
ment A acts noncooperatively, it fails to take account of the fact that its actions, by influencing the
world relative price ,generatesan externality which affects the welfare of agents in Country B. In
particular, the noncooperative level of G is generally too large, relative to the cooperative equili-
brium leveL To see this, we evaluate OW/8G at the noncooperative equilibrium level. At this equili-
brium (denoted by subscript N), equation (8) applies, so that
-OUfiEA 8G N OC! ' (15)
Thus, in general, in the normal case, when 8or/8G < 0 (15) implies 8W/8GZ I< 0;i.e., aggregate wel-
fare is increased if Country A reduces its expenditure on the export good from its Nash equilibrium
level. In the less likely case, when 8or/OG'> 0, its expenditure on that good should be increased.6
Similar comments apply to the other forms of government expenditure, enabling us to summarize with
the following:
Proposition 1:Provided goods are normal in the sense defined, then a noncooperative equilibrium
leads to an overexpansion of government expenditure on export goods and an
underexpansion of government expenditure on import goods, relative to the8
cooperativeequilibrium where joint utilities are being maximized.
The welfare function in (13) assigns equal (arbitrary) weights to the two economies. This is the
criterion used throughout both the monetary and fiscal literature analyzing the gains from policy coor-
dination. As seen in (14), the cooperative equilibrium involves the redistribution of income between
the economies through terms of trade effects. But this may not represent a world social optimum.
Chari and Kehoe (1987) suggest an alternative benchmark in which the cooperative equilibrium and
the social optimum coincide. As they note, this may be attained if in addition to setting expenditure
levels, the government sets lump sum taxes to achieve the appropriate distribution.
The social optimum equilibrium can be formally derived as the solution to a planning problem in
which private consumptions, outputs, and government expenditures are chosen to maximize a
weighted average of utilities
=AAUA+
subject to the market clearing conditions (5), (7a), (7b). Performing the maximization, the optimality
conditions characterizing the social optimum can be shown to include
i=A,B j=x,y
OG;8C,'





which analogously to (15) implies an overexpansion on G in general. Indeed, an analogous proposi-
tion to Proposition 1 holds with respect to the social optimum., although the degree of underexpansion
is clearly different, reflecting the distortion of the cooperative equilibrium from the social optimum.9
5. A LOGARITHMIC EXAMPLE
We now consider the special case where: (i) the two countries are each specialized in the pro-
duction of a single good; (ii) the government spends only on the domestic good; (iii) the respective
utility functions are logarithmic:
i=A,B (17)
where c+=1,and good x is produced by Country A and y by Country B. The budget con-
straints for the respective economies are:
C+C=_GA (18a)
iC!+C=QB_GB (18b)
where QA, QB, denote the fixed levels of output. The demand functions for the two goods in the two




The relative price, o, is obtained from the balance of trade equilibrium condition
C!=uC (20)
(A.(QA _GA —' BJBi-B
Therelative price is therefore inversely proportional to the disposable incomes in the two economies.
Furthermore, substituting (20) into (19), leads to
=1A(A—GA); C =a(QB—GB) (21a)
C=cz(QO_GU) (21b)
The interesting feature is that through the adjustment in the relative price, the equilibrium quantities10
of the imported good in each case depend upon the other country's disposable income. This fact gives
rise to a large spillover in the effects of fiscal policy in one country on the other.
The next step is to substitute (21 a), (21 b) into the utility functions (1 7a), (1 7b) and this yields
Ui(GA, G8) =K+ aln(QA
—GA)+1n(Q
—G)+$' ln(G')i =A,B (22)









Equations (23a), (23b) are of course the respective reaction functions in the two economies. Observe
that each is independent of the other's .decision. This means that the Nash equilibrium is dominant
and the assumption of a zero conjectured response is correct.7 The reaction functions are plotted in
Figure 1 as horizontal and vertical lines respectively, which intersect at the point A, where
GA =(flA);G=a8 (24)
The implied levels of utility in the two countries are obtained by substituting these two solutions in
(19a), (19b).
Suppose now that the two policy makers act cooperatively, and maximize their joint utility func-
tions
UA +UB =KA +K8 +(a+a)ln(QA _GA)+(a+a)ln(GB_GB)
+ frinGA + B in G





the solutions to which are
GA_( flAA. GB_(B 'QB (25)
This is illustrated by the point B in Figure 1, which lies at the tangency points between the two
indifference curves. Comparing (24) with (25) (or point A with point B), we see that cooperation
leads to a reduction in the levels of government expenditure, consistent with the general result of Sec-
tiOn 4.
An interesting issue concerns the magnitude of the difference between the two equilibria. One
conclusion prevalent among the macroeconomic models dealing with this question, is that the non-
cooperative and cooperative equilibria are typically closely clustered. The numerical gains from
cooperation are small. In the present example we find that the respective percentage changes in the
levels of GA, G, (measured from the noncooperative equilibria as base) are
LGA-_________ -_________
GAa'+a!+fr' GBa+4+$9
Suppose,for example, one takes at= 4 = .6,a =a! = .4,8A= B = .3,suggesting that each
economy has a preference for its own good. Then from (24), the ratios of government expenditure to
output in the non-cooperative equilibrium in the two economies are GA/QA =GB/QB=.333.Moving
to the cooperative equilibrium, reduces these shares to around .231 respectively (see (25)), which is a
relative reduction in government expenditure of nearly 31%. While the ratios of consumptions to
disposable income remain fixed (set by aJ),theabsolute levels increase correspondingly by around
15%. Although the parameter values underlying these calculations are arbitrary, they are certainly
plausible insofar as the implied shares of government expenditure in output, and consumption patterns
are concerned.12
These differences in the equilibria are substantially larger than those typically obtained from
macroeconomic models. For example, the dynamic simulations of Oudiz and Sachs (1985) find that
the optimal paths followed by output and inflation under noncooperative behavior change remarkably
little when a cooperative equilibrium is considered. Turnovsky and d'Orey (1986) find the changes in
the optimal level of money stock between the two equilibria to be typically small (around 2-4%) for
simulations in which the elasticity of the demand for output with respect to the relative price is
around unity, although it increases to around 15% as this elasticity falls to .1. They find utility gains
to be almost negligible in the former case and to increase to around 10% (depending upon the distur-
bance), in the latter case. Similarly, Taylor (1985), whose numerical analysis is also based on a rela-
tive price elasticity of .1, finds utility gains to be around 10%. Taken together, these pieces of evi-
dence suggest that the gains from cooperation as determined by these macro models are modest. The
larger differences between the two equilibria suggested by the present analysis can be attributed to the
strong international spillovers generated by relative price movements in the present framework. The
utility gains, however, are arbitrary and are proportional to the choice of Q.
6.THE EFFECTS OF A COALITION
Most of the formal literature deals with the gains from cooperation in a two country world. But
in reality, cooperative arrangements are formed among groups of countries, with some countries being
excluded from such coalitions. In this section we address an important issue, namely, how the gains
from cooperation between two countries A and B say, impact on a third country C which produces a
third good zsay.8For tractability, we consider the question within the logarithmic model of Section 5.
In this analysis the number of economies and goods remains fixed (at three); what changes is the
number of economies participating in the cooperative arrangement.
Augmented to three countries, the model contains the following relationships. The utility func-
tions for Country i:13
U' =a inC +in C + ainC' + fi'inG
(26) i=A,B,C
and corresponding budget constraints
C + C + CZ'cTZ+GA =Q4
C!/ +C+Cc/ +GB=QB (27)
C/c +Ccr,/o+C+Ga= QC
where now
,isthe relative price of good y to good x,
o is the relative price of good ztogood x.




togetherwith three market clearing conditions:
C/+Cf+Cf+G1 =Q'i=A,B,C j=x,y,z (29)
although only two of these are independent.











—GA);C = 2AB — G)/'1; C = — Ga)/b
C=a(QA _GA)i,b; C=4(QB -G8); C=cx(QC -Gb/b
Cf= a(QA
—Gb; C= aC(QB
— C= cxC(QC — Ga)14
The corresponding levels of utility are therefore of the form
U =K+ cin(QA —GA)+ cr in (QB—GB)
(30) +a1n(Q_GC)+lflGi i=A,B,C
Suppose initially that all three countries act noncooperatively. The optimal levels of government
expenditure for the three countries are of the form
GA=( )QA.G=(BB)Q; G4=()Qc (31)
which are analogous to (24), obtained previously.
Suppose now that Countries A and B form a coalition and cooperate to maximize their joint wel-
fare UA + U. The optimality conditions are
—




GB= P QB (32b) 4+4+fiB
with both G' and G being reduced from their respective noncooperative levels. Denoting these
reductions by dGA, dGB, the welfare gains for Country A are
A
dUA =—' c/GB (33)
(QB_GB)
whereGB is evaluated at the noncooperative leveL
How does the formation of this coalition affect the welfare of the excluded Country C? The
answer is given by the expression
C C
dUC=— — c/GA—— dGB
(QA_GA) (Q8G3)
which with dGA, dGB both being negative, implies an unambiguous welfare improvement. In fact, the
welfare gains to Country C may quite plausibly exceed those accruing to either of the partners A and15
B. This is so, for example, if all countries have identical tastes and the coefficients a' are equal.
Essentially the reason is that the coalition reduces both GA and G and this has a favorable effect on
the terms of trade for Country C with respect to both of its trading partners.9 Thus we find that at
least for this logarithmic example, the formation of a coalition between two countries may yield
greater benefit to an excluded country, than it does to either of the partners.
Finally, suppose that Country C joins the coalition, so that all three act cooperatively. Maximiz-
ing the aggregate utility UA + UB + Uc, we find
A B i=A,B,C j=x,y,z
a3 + a3 + a,C+flu
Thisinvolves a further reduction in government expenditure and the mutual gains from cooperation
increase. For Country A, for example,
A
dU-' =— — dGB — — S dGc
(QB_GB) (QC_GC)
which now gains from the reduction in public expenditure in the new member Country C, as well as
in that of G. Country C gains from joining because of the additional reductions in G-', G this
induces. Thus, at least in this example, we find that the gains from cooperation increase with the
number of countries cooperating.
7. CONCLUSIONS: REINTERPRETATION AS A TWO-PERIOD ANALYSIS
This paper has analyzed the gains from fiscal cooperation, within the context of the standard
two commodity real trade model. Using this framework, we have shown how the adjustment in the
terms of trade is the critical factor in determining the effects of moving from a noncooperative equili-
brium. In general, a noncooperative equilibrium leads to an overexpansion of government expendi-
ture on the export good an an underexpansion on the import good, relative to an equilibrium in which
both governments act cooperatively. Aggregate world welfare will be increased by a reduction in
government expenditure on the former and an increase in government expenditure on the latter. The16
specific example of a logarithmic economy has been considered. We have demonstrated how, at least
within such an economy, the formation of a coalition among two countries may confer welfare gains
on an excluded third country, which exceed those accruing to either partner.
It is straightforward to reinterpret the framework in terms of a two-period single commodity
model, such as that used by Hamada (1986). The subscripts x, y may now be reinterpreted as two
periods (the present and future say), so that the utility functions (1) and the production possibilities
curves (3) apply intertemporally. Furthermore, combining equations (5)and(6) yields
ri+ — (ip— + — I_i zp\z xl y
whichnow can be interpreted as being a two-period intertemporal budget constraint in which o
denotesthe intertemporal price (the interest rate), rather than the intratemporal terms of trade.'° For-
mally, everything else applies as before. The assumptions E'>0,E!>0can now be interpreted that
Country A has an excess demand for future goods and is therefore a lender, while Country B has an
excess demand for current goods and is a borrower.
With this interpretation, the effects of fiscal cooperation depend upon the adjustment of the
interest rate. In what we have called the normal case, an increase in government expenditure on the
current good raises the current interest rate, while an increase in government expenditure in the
future period lowers it. In general, we find that a noncooperative equilibrium leads to an overexpan-
sion of government expenditure on present goods and an underexpansion on future goods, by the
lender, relative to the cooperative equilibrium. The reverse holds true with respect to the borrower.G'
Figure 1
Noncooperative and Cooperative Equilibria:
Logarithmic Case
Reaction Curve Country A
A
Reaction Curve Country BF-i
*I wish to thank Michael Devereux and the referee for helpful comments.
See, e.g., Canzoneri and Gray (1985), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Miller and Salmon (1985), Currie
and Levine (1985), Taylor (1985), Turnovsky and d'Orey (1986).
2.Thischange of emphasis is apparent from the recent NBER Conference on the international
aspects of fiscal policy; see Frenkel (1987).
3.Our choice of import and export goods implies E> 0, E < 0, E> 0, E < 0.
4.Recall that the formula for the optimal tariff is independent of the utility function, or marginal
utility. The reason for this is that, unlike government expenditure, the tariff rate does not enter
the utility function directly. If, to complete the analogy, one assumes that G does not generate
independent utility, then (13) reduces to 1 + E,A8o/8G =0.This can be rewritten as
rA cA '-'x i3o'x
Thatis, the ratio of government expenditure to the excess supply for the export good equals the
elasticity of the relative price with respect to government expenditure on the export good.
5.Two conditions assumed include: (i) That an increase in the relative price of good x in either
country reduces the excess demand for that good, while incresing it for the other good; (ii) that
the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. Condition (i) in turn requires the usual assumption that the
substitution effect of a price change dominates the income effect.
In an Appendix to this paper, we show how invoking (i) and (ii) implies
8E dauA/aCd 8UA/8C sgn —-=sgn—i-=sgn—-[A A] [auA/ac]
The first term in the parentheses can be shown to be proportional to the effect of a decrease in
income on the excess demand E and is presumably negative. This reflects the fact that an
increase in G raises taxes, thereby lowering disposable income, private consumption of good y
and excess demand for that good. The second term describes how the change in governmentF-2
expenditure on good x affects the marginal rate of substitution between the two private goods.
Under mild restrictions, including weak separability of the utility function in private and public
goods, when this latter term is zero, the first term dominates, implying inequality (9).
6.One can also show that in the "normal" case, the reduction in G as one moves from the non-
cooperative to the cooperative equilibrium will raise real national output in both countries and
the volume of real trade, both measured in terms of good x.
7.That is, the Nash noncooperative equilibrium is also a consistent conjectural variations equili-
brium.
8. My interest in analyzing this issue grew out of remarks made at a recent conference on the inter-
national effects of monetary policy, held recently at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
9.The terms of trade are,




It is clear that these both improve through reduction in dGA, dGB.
10.More preciesly, we redefine o =1/(1+ r), where r is the interest rate.R-1
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